

# Telenet Group NV/SA Law Enforcement Disclosure Report 2024 Report (March 2025)



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#### **Executive summary**

This report on the legal obligations for network operators and providers of electronic communication services aims to offer insights into the context and extent of surveillance and collection requests regarding customer data initiated by the Belgian government and authorities at Telenet Group NV. The report includes statistics on conventional (day-to-day) authority requests and information on legislation regarding mandatory 'data retention' for law enforcement purposes. This report is published on the Telenet Group NV corporate website in the section Sustainability Reporting.

Telenet is obliged to report on these statistics towards the Belgian telecom regulator BIPT (Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunication). The same information can be found below.



#### 1. Statistics

BIPT renewed its requirements during Q3 2023. This means that several changes in the statistics needed to be taken up. For Telenetgroup this meant that several changes on the CCJ environment needs to be implemented. Due to other priorities these changes are not yet fully rolled out. On 16<sup>th</sup> of May 2024 our Regulatory department has delivered the statistics we could obtain to the Belgian regulator (BIPT).

On top there were no additional (expected) legislation changes or increased automation which would effect the statistics since the political situation in Belgium. We expect more changes in the course of 2025 as a new government is onboarded. Also the changes in geo political landscape since beginning of February might have impact with on top the situation and drugs criminal related facts in predominantly Brussels might have impact on the number of investigations and requests towards CCJ Telenetgroup.

#### 1.1 Statistics regarding requests for subscription, usage, and content data

<u>Scope:</u> All warrants and requests by the judicial authorities in execution of the Law on Electronic Communications of 13 June 2005. This regards insights into subscription, usage and content (legal intercept) data.

#### Requests received:

Autoriteiten	Aantal vorderingen van een autoriteit om bewaarde gegevens te verkrijgen die in 2024 naar de	Aantal aanvragen van een autoriteit om bewaarde gegevens te verkrijgen die in 2024 naar de operator zijn verzonden buiten	Aantal aanvragen van een autoriteit om bewaarde gegevens te verkrijgen die in 2024 naar de operator zijn verzonden via	Aantal aanvragen ontvangen van de autoriteiten waarvoor geen gegevens werden	Motiver			rstrekken va r de operato	an de gegevens <mark>oren)</mark>	
	operator zijn verzonden via TANK of buiten TANK om (in te vullen door de operatoren)	TANK om en mits de gevraagde gegevens werden verstrekt (in te vullen door de operatoren)	TANK en mits de gevraagde gegevens werden verstrekt (in te vullen door de NTSU)	verstrekt (in te vullen door de operatoren)	No Account found		Non- reliabl e reques t	Legal document not valid	Outside juridiction; MLAT requested	OTHER
Voorbeeld	50	40	50	10	1	3	2	2	2	
BMA				0						1
Buitenlandse autoriteiten				0						
Gerechtelijke autoriteiten	25654	73641		256	183	7	14	52		11233
CCB	109	143		0						
Cel Vermiste Personen				0						
FSMA	1	3		0						
BIPT (Officieren van gerechtelijke politie)	1	13		1	1					
BIPT (administratieve procedure)				0						
Ombudsdienst voor telecommunicatie	964	2270		7	1		2	4		
Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten	7	18		4	1	1		2		
Nooddiensten	44	72		0						
FOD Economie (energie, kwaliteit en veiligheid, economische inspectie)	29	94		2	2					
FOD Economie (Statistieken)	21	37		0						
FOD Volksgezondheid	1			0	I					

Telenetgroup has based ourselves on the fact that the warrant number is unique – as stated earlier a number of items we can not yet deliver. The development for these items was passed to our development teams as from the moment we became aware.



#### 1.2 Statistics on identification requests, IMEI- and location tracking

These statistics are no longer given to the authorities. The regulator is purely basing himself on the TANK statistics within the environment itself.

On the real time tracking (location) this is no longer reported to the regulator.

#### 1.3 Other stats given to the regulator

#### a) Requests coming from outside of Belgium

Till 2024 we did not capture this statistics as CCJ is not allowed to respond to foreign authorities. As from 2025 we will now report on the number of requests. However till e-evidence act is in place we do not expect large numbers of requests.

#### b) MAC addresses (historic) per requested time (age)

	die werd gericht	t aan de operatoi	n <mark>MAC-adressen</mark> waarvoor gegev r in 2024, naar gelang van de tijd o anvraag heeft ontvangen			
Autoriteiten			3 maanden =< # < 6 maanden	6 maanden =< # < 9 maanden	9 maanden =< # < 12 maanden	> 12 maanden
Voorbeeld	9	7	5	3	2	1
BMA						
Buitenlandse autoriteiten						-
Gerechtelijke autoriteiten	34	7	2	7	7	
CCB						
Cel Vermiste Personen						
FSMA						
BIPT (Officieren van gerechtelijke politie)						
BIPT (administratieve procedure)						
Ombudsdienst voor telecommunicatie						
inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten						
Nooddiensten						
FOD Economie (energie, kwaliteit en veiligheid, economische inspectie)						
FOD Economie (Statistieken)						
FOD Volksgezondheid						

Some continued   Some	5 5857  saantal aanvragen de aanvang van l die buiten TANK p de gegevens zij.  1 maand =< #	4292  van bewaarde gegevens net contract), waarvoor om werd gericht aan de n bewaard en de datum	2 3345  (uitgezonderd MAC-ad gegevens werden verst operator in 2024, naar waarop de bevoegde a	9 maanden =< # < 12  f 3869  ressen en klantgegeven tuurd naar de autoriteit gelang van de tijd die i utoriteit de verstrekking 9 maanden =< # < 12	1 1023 s die werden naar aanleiding van s verstreken tussen d g ervan heeft gevraag:
Gerechtelijke autoriteiten 4710  Gerechtelijke autoriteiten 4710  Vermeld het verzameld bi een aanvraag datum waard  Autoriteiten # < 1 maand  Voorbeeld 15  BMA  Buitenlandse autoriteiten	5857  aantal aanvragen de aanvang van I die <u>buiten TANK</u> p de gegevens ziji  1 maand =< #	4292 van bewaarde gegevens net contract), waarvoor om werd gericht aan de n bewaard en de datum	3345  (uitgezonderd MAC-ad gegevens werden verst operator in 2024, naar waarop de bevoegde a	3869 Iressen en klantgegeven tuurd naar de autoriteit gelang van de tijd die i utoriteit de verstrekking	1023 s die werden naar aanleiding van s verstreken tussen d g ervan heeft gevraag
Gerechtelijke autoriteiten Gerechtelijke autoriteiten Autoriteiten  Autoriteiten  Worbeeld Butenlandse autoriteiten  4710  Vermeld het verzameld bi een aanvraag datum waard 4710  Vermeld het verzameld bi een aanvraag datum waard 4710  Vermeld het verzameld bi een aanvraag datum waard 4710  Suitenlandse autoriteiten	5857  aantal aanvragen de aanvang van I die <u>buiten TANK</u> p de gegevens ziji  1 maand =< #	4292 van bewaarde gegevens net contract), waarvoor om werd gericht aan de n bewaard en de datum	3345  (uitgezonderd MAC-ad gegevens werden verst operator in 2024, naar waarop de bevoegde a	3869 Iressen en klantgegeven tuurd naar de autoriteit gelang van de tijd die i utoriteit de verstrekking	1023 s die werden naar aanleiding van s verstreken tussen d g ervan heeft gevraag
Autoriteiten  Autoriteiten  Vermeld het verzameld bi een aanvraag datum waard  # < 1 maand  Voorbeeld  BMA  Bultenlandse autoriteiten	aantal aanvragen de aanvang van hide <u>buiten TANK</u> p de gegevens zijn  1 maand =< #	van bewaarde gegevens net contract), waarvoor om werd gericht aan de n bewaard en de datum	(uitgezonderd MAC-ad gegevens werden verst operator <u>in 2024</u> , nar waarop de bevoegde a	lressen en klantgegeven tuurd naar de autoriteit r gelang van de tijd die i utoriteit de verstrekking	is die werden naar aanleiding van is verstreken tussen d g ervan heeft gevraage
Autoriteiten  Autoriteiten  # < 1 maand  Voorbeeld  BMA Buitenlandse autoriteiten	de aanvang van I die <u>buiten TANK</u> p de gegevens ziji 1 maand =< #	net contract), waarvoor om werd gericht aan de n bewaard en de datum	gegevens werden verst operator <u>in 2024</u> , naar waarop de bevoegde a	tuurd naar de autoriteit gelang van de tijd die i utoriteit de verstrekking	naar aanleiding van is verstreken tussen d g ervan heeft gevraag
BMA Buitenlandse autoriteiten					
Buitenlandse autoriteiten	4	7	3	12	2
2000					
Gerechtelijke autoriteiten 38098	6731	6251	7634	12916	1954
CCB 143					
Cel Vermiste Personen					
FSMA					3
BIPT (Officieren van gerechtelijke politie) 13					
BIPT (administratieve procedure)					
Ombudsdienst voor telecommunicatie 1199	31	24	4	909	103
inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 3	9		6		
Nooddiensten 24				34	14
FOD Economie (energie, kwaliteit en veiligheid, economische inspectie) 16			8	27	17 6
FOD Economie (Statistieken) 13	19	7		18	



#### 1.4 Tank Requests

Tank rollout did not progress during the year 2024 due to capacity reasons at the authorities for a  $2^{nd}$  year in a row. The next phase 3.1 is foreseen in Q2 2025. executed by this new channel. In total at end of 2024 almost 43% of the total requests were handled without any human interaction (with exception of the audit controls on the requests – spot check if the requests are valid).

TANK REQUESTS (Full Automatic)	JAN	FEB	MRT	APR	MEI	JUNI	JULI	AUG	SEP	ост	NOV	DEC	2024
IDF-01 - MSISDN (09/21)	1369	1209	1390	1422	1149	1080	1188	1021	1122	1271	1113	997	14.331
IDN-03 (14/02/22) ICCD	7	2	4	2	2	5	1	2	6	0	6	3	40
IDN-06 (14/02/22) - IMSI	11	4	3	4	6	9	3	2	4	5	2	5	58
TRK-01 MSISDN (09/21)	178	211	203	151	198	190	206	155	173	224	138	153	2.180
TRK-02 IMEI (09/21)	565	581	575	603	475	541	595	413	560	581	452	500	6.441
TRK-03 (14/02/22) - IMSI	14	19	9	16	6	10	17	11	25	17	7	9	160
HIS-01													0
HIS-02													0
HIS-03													0
SRV-01													0
SRV-02													0
SRV-03													0
Total	2.144	2.026	2.184	2.198	1.836	1.835	2.010	1.604	1.890	2.098	1.718	1.667	23.210

Still around 13% of the potential request that could be handled by TANK are executed manually by CCJ TLNG as there is not yet a legislation that obliges the competent authorities that are allocated to the use of TANK. On top there are several authorities that do not yet work via TANK.



# 2. Legal framework

#### 2.1 Introduction

The legal framework that regulates the cooperation of an operator of a network or the electronic communications service provider with the government is formed by a series of articles spread across various Acts and Royal Decrees (RD). Below you will find an overview of the most important articles in these Acts and Royal Decrees with a brief description of the content and the competent government. An in-depth reading of these articles is necessary for operators and service providers to be able to estimate their full scope. This overview is limited to the cooperation with judicial authorities and intelligence services. Other authorities (e.g. tax inspection) also have powers to question operators and service providers, but this document does not go further in detail regarding these authorities.

**Update 2023:** Following the annulment of the previous data retention law by the Constitutional Court, a new data retention legislation was published in August 2022 which invokes changes.

**Update 2024**: Most of the changes are implemented regarding the data retention law. There was some delay due to the objections to the legislation but these objections were dismissed for the greater part. Also seen the fact that Belgium is still under OCAD security level 3 the reduced retention on the bases of location has not yet been requested by the legislature. Some new requirements are not yet fully cleared out but implemented on the bases of bilateral negotiations with the requesting parties. However this could later on lead to new investments when legislator changes their point of view. To date TNG has mitigated these risks.

#### 2.2 Basic provisions: respect for privacy and secrecy of communications

The protection of the personal and family life of each person is guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights). Any deviation from this is only possible if foreseen by law. The Belgian Criminal Law states in Articles 259bis and 314bis that the interception of private communications is punishable. These articles also stipulate that the usage of equipment to intercept such communications as well as the use or trading of information obtained from illegal interception are deemed illegal. The Law Electronic Communications of 13 June 2005 (LEA) further elaborates on the protection of electronic communications, and states that it is forbidden to learn about the existence of electronic communications, identity and location of the parties involved and of the content of these communications. It is forbidden to keep track of these communications unless they have been anonymized or in certain cases consent was obtained. The LEA also determines the cases and circumstances in which the above-mentioned legal principles can be waived. The LEA determines which electronic communications data should be kept and lists the authorities who can retrieve this information. The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Security and Intelligence Act provide the powers and circumstances under which competent authorities may request electronic communications information, intercept electronic communications, or ask the cooperation of an operator or service provider. These Acts require operators or service providers to cooperate with the prosecuting authorities.

Update 2024: As stated earlier we can expect a change in legislation in 2025 on the working of CCJ especially the collaboration on the e-Evidence and TANK implementation.



# 2.3 Code of criminal procedure

Below you can find the main articles on data retention and which entity can requests the retrieval of the data.

Art.	Description	Competence
39ter	Conservation of designated data	Criminal investigation officer
39quater §2	Conservation of specified data on	police service designated by his Majesty
	demand from a foreign government	
46bis	Retrieval of data about	Crown prosecutor
	<ul> <li>Identification of users / devices</li> </ul>	Directly or via
	<ul> <li>Information of services</li> </ul>	a police service designated by his
		Majesty
88bis	Retrieval of	Research Judge
	Traffic and location data	State Attorney in certain cases
	Both historical and real time	Directly or via
		a police service designated by his
		Majesty
90ter	Intercepting communications	Investigating judge
90quater §2		State Attorney in certain cases
		Directly or via
		a police service designated by his
		Majesty
90ter	Provide information / cooperation to	Investigating judge
90quater §4	gain access to communications or	State Attorney in certain cases
	systems	Directly or via
		a police service designated by his
		Majesty
464/13	Cf. Art. 46bis but then in the context of	Judge who keeps track of execution of
	a criminal investigation	punishments
464/25	Cf. Art. 88bis but then in the context of	Judge who keeps track of execution of
	a criminal investigation	punishments
464/26	Cf. Art. 90ter but then in the context of	Judge who keeps track of execution of
	a criminal investigation	punishments

<u>LOI - WET (fgov.be)</u>: for investigations and judicial investigations

LOI - WET (fgov.be): for criminal investigations



# 2.4 Royal Decree establishing the obligation to cooperate in court proceedings

**RD January 2003:** Terms and provisioning for the legal obligation to cooperate in legal warrants relating to electronic communications, hereby you can find the main and relevant articles out of this RD .

Art.	Description
1	Definitions
2	Obligation of CCJ based on Belgian territory Possibility to have a shared CCJ (Collaboration Cell Justice)
	Security Clearance CCJ members
	Permanent availability CCJ
	Notice of information (and amendments thereto) regarding CCJ and members of
	BIPT
	Obligation to protect information CCJ and ensure confidentiality
3	Collaboration regarding identifications Article 46bis - appointment NTSU CTIF
	Powers of NTSU CTIF to access customer data
	Powers of NTSU CTIF to control this data transfer
4	Collaboration regarding access to traffic and localization data - in real time or
	historical
	Timeframe in which to respond to a question
	Power of government to regulate format and transfer mode
5	Co-operation for interception of electronic communications
	Indication NTSU CTIF as a central service intercepting communication
6	Obligation to meet government requests
	Quality requirements of transmitted data: Correlatable, in clear language
	Real-time forwarding in a secure manner
	To respect ETSI and 3GPP standards - authority of the government to choose
	options
8	Obligation to time synchronization of operator systems
	Accuracy of notified times
10	Provisions concerning investment, exploitation and maintenance costs
	Reference to attachment for fees
10bis	Authorization of government to determine format and transfer method
	Obligation to provide information if electronic exchange is not possible
Attachments	Information on cooperation fees
	Definitions: Query / Query Criterion / Specific Request
	Fees for performance
	Annual fee
	Reaction possibility when requesting accumulation

LOI - WET (fgov.be)



# 2.5 Intelligence Services Act

Act of 30 November 1998 - Act regulating the intelligence and security services

Art.	Description	Competence
18/7	Retrieval of data about	Head of service of Intelligence Service
	<ul> <li>Identification of users / devices</li> </ul>	Information Officer in certain cases
	<ul> <li>Information of services</li> </ul>	
18/8	Retrieval of	Head of service of Intelligence Service
	Traffic and location data	Information Officer in certain cases
	Both historical and real time	
18/17	Interception of communications	Head of service of Intelligence Service
		after agreement by BIM (Special
		Intelligence Methods) committee

#### LOI - WET (fgov.be)

# 2.6 Duty to collaborate with warrants provided by the intelligence services

RD 12 OCTOBER 2010 - Royal Decree on the arrangements for the legal obligation (warrant-based) to cooperate with the intelligence and security services relating to electronic communications

Art	Description
1	Definitions
2	Obligation of CCJ based on Belgian territory
	Possibility to have a shared CCJ
	Security Clearance CCJ members
	Permanent availability CCJ
	Notice of information (and changes thereto) regarding CCJ and members to BIPT
	Obligation to protect information CCJ and ensure confidentiality
3	Participation for identifications Art. 18/7
	Jurisdiction of intelligence services to access to customer data
	Jurisdiction of intelligence services to regulate this data
4	Participation traffic and localization data - in real time or historical
	Timeframe in which to respond to a question
	Power of government to regulate format and transfer mode
5	Cooperation for interception of electronic communications
	Designation of a network connection point determined by head of service
	intelligence service
6	Power of government to determine format and way of transfer
	Obligation to provide information if electronic exchange is not possible
7	Provisions relating to investment, exploitation and maintenance costs
	Reference to attachment of RD obligation of collaboration legal proceedings for
	fees for inquiries by intelligence services
8	Obligation to meet government requests
	Quality requirements of transmitted data: correlated, in clear language
	Real-time forwarding in a secure manner
	Respecting ETSI and 3GPP standards - authority of the government to determine
	options
	Obligation of time synchronization of operator systems
	Accuracy of transmitted times

#### LOI - WET (fgov.be)



# 2.7 Law on Electronic Communications (LEA) of 13 June 2005

Art.	Description
122	Basic principle to delete or anonymize the traffic data, but exceptions apply:  - Invoicing - Marketing purposes - To combat fraud or malicious use of the network - Security purposes
123	Clarifies under which conditions operators can keep and process other location data than traffic data.
124	General principle of secrecy of communication: prohibition of notice, identification, interception and use of this information
125	Exceptions to Article 124
126	determines which identification data operators must keep (to the extent processed or generated by the operator).
126/2, §2	Determines the meta data which must be stored by the operators
127/1	Overview of the authorities which can receive information from the operators
127/2, §1, §2 and	quality requirements for storing the data. The operators can only store the
§3	data in the EU. Operators must keep a logbook and any consultation of the data should be logged.
127/3, §1 and §2	rules with respect to the Coordination Cel

#### LOI - WET (fgov.be)

# 2.8 Royal Decree on retention of data

RD concerning execution of Article 126 of the Act of 13 June 2005 on electronic communications (13/09/2013)

Art	Description
2	Definitions
3	Concerning fixed telephony: identification information / information on traffic and localisation
4	Concerning mobile telephony: identification information / information on traffic and localisation
5	Concerning Internet access: identification information / information on traffic and localisation
6	Concerning electronic mail services: identification information / information on traffic and localisation
7	Obligations when combining different services required Time stamp precision / synchronisation
8	Obligations concerning the responsible for the protection of Privacy-related information
9	Obligation to provide BIPT with statistics

### LOI - WET (fgov.be)



#### 2.9 RD regarding the identification of users of prepaid cards

RD regarding identification of end-user of public electronic mobile communications services provided by a prepaid card (27/11/2016).

Art.	Description
1	Application field: Telephone number BE / IMSI BE
	Exclusion of identification: M2M Cards
2	Definitions: document of identification / method of identification
3-6	Obligations of end user in identification matter and reporting of theft/loss
7	Basic principles of obligation of identification
8	Obligation of deactivation when notified of theft /loss
9	Obligation of verification using valid identification methods
10	Authorisation through lecture / scan / photograph of identity card
11	Obligatory verification that Belgian identity card BE wasn't stolen or was the object
	of fraud
	Actions to take when confronted with irregularities
12	Information that can be retained for the means of identification
13	Obligation to propose at least one valid identification method
14	Terms to physically identify an end user
15	Terms to identify an end user with the electronic identity card
16	Terms to identify a user with the help of an identification service provider

17	Terms to identify with the help of an online bank payment
18	Terms when extension of product
19	Terms to identify by means of an electronic communications device

Telenetgroup has implemented in December 2021 an MRZ capable customer onboarding and fall out (for documents not readable with e-reader or MRZ can be followed up). BIPT agreed to the solution.

#### 2.10 MD on buffering and filtering of electronic communications

Ministerial Decree (MD) concerning the execution of Article 6, § 3, sentence two and Article 10bis, sentence two of the RD of 9 January 2003 concerning the terms of compulsory legal collaboration in case of judiciary demands concerning electronic communications This MD will define the followings terms and conditions:

- The instalment of a buffer capacity by the operators to ensure that in the event of a connection failure between operator and NTSU CTIF, no data will be lost
- Filtering possibilities that an operator has to provide before the data reaches NTSU CTIF.
   Objective of this filtering is to limit the amount of electronic intercepted data to the strict minimum as requested by the investigating judge. MB published 05/08/2020.

Telenetgroup is compliant however testing with CTIF has still to be planned by them.

2023 no change in the situation for the moment still awaiting interaction with CTIF on the testing (planned interaction 10/2024)



2024: Still no filtering but in Q4 2024 we started working on a first phase. We also got the instruction from CTIF to decouple the VOLTE traffic towards there Legal intercept system in traffic from own subscribers and inbound roaming traffic. Testing on buffering did still not take place.

Moniteur Belge - Belgisch Staatsblad (fgov.be)